Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming by Connolly, William E.
> . f 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
comparative study of social transfomtioyls 
CSST 
WORKING PAPERS 
The University of ,Michigan 
Ann Arbor 
"Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of 
Becoming". 
William E. ConnoUy 
CSST Working CRSO Working 
Paper # 1 13 Paper #540 
October 1996 
Sufferinu. - Justice. and the politics of Becoming 
William E. Connolly 
The Johns Hopkins University 
Suffering and Ethics 
People suffer. We suffer from illness, disease, 
unemployment, dead-end jobs, bad marriages, the loss of loved 
ones, social relocation, tyranny, police brutality, street 
violence, existential anxiety, guilt, envy, resentment, 
depression, stigmatization, rapid social change, sexual 
harassment, child abuse, poverty, medical malpractice, 
alienation, political defeat, toothaches, the loss of self- 
esteem, identity-panic, torture, and fuzzy categories. We 
organize suffering into categories to help cope with it, but 
often these categories themselves conceal some forms of 
suffering, even contribute to them. This latter experience leads 
some to suspect that suffering is never entirely reducible to any 
determinate set of categories. To suffer is to bear, endure or 
undergo, to submit to something injurious, to become dis- 
oraanized. Suffering subsists on the underside of agency, 
mastery, wholeness, joy, and comfort. It is, therefore, 
ubiquitous. 
But there I go.., moving from the agony of suffering to a 
comforting reflection on it. Appropriating suffering to a reading 
of the human condition. For severe suffering exceeds every 
interpretation of it while persistently demanding interpretation. 
Without suffering, it is unlikely we would have much depth in our 
philosophies and religions. But with it, life is tough.., and 
miserable for many. 
Does the poly-cultural character of suffering reveal 
something about the human condition? And.how contestable and 
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culturally specific are the medical, psychological, religious, 
ethical, therapeutic, sociostructural, economic and political 
categories through which suffering is acknowledged and ad- 
ministered today? Is "sufferingn a porous universal, whose 
persistence as a cultural term reveals how conceptually discrete 
injuries, wounds, and agonies are experientially fungible, 
crossing and confounding the fragile boundaries we construct 
between them? Or is it a barren generality, seducing theorists 
into metaphysical explorations far removed from specific injuries 
in need of medical or moral or religious or political or 
therapeutic or military attention? Any response to this question 
draws upon one or more of the theoretical paradigms already 
noted. A political theorist might focus on power struggles 
between disparate professionals over the legitimate definition 
and treatment of suffering. An evangelist might minister 
instances that fit the Christian model. And a physician might 
medicate theorists and spiritualists burned out by the projects 
these faiths commend. Is the bottom line, then, that today 
people go to the doctor when they really need help? Perhaps. But 
they might pray after getting the treatment. Or file a 
malpractice suit. Or join a political movement to redesign the 
health care system. Sufferers are full of surprises. 
Among fieid contenders for primacy in the domain of 
suffering, ethical theory has pretty much dropped out of the 
running. The reason is clear, even if astonishing. Contemporary 
professional paradigms of ethics, represented fairly well by John 
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Rawls and Jurgen Habermas, have drifted from the putative object 
of ethical concern. 
Even though professional ethicists have relinquished 
authority over suffering, moralitv--as a set of cultural 
interpretations of goodness, obligation, and evil--continues to 
play a major role in its delineation and treatment. But 
morality, as played out in this culture, is divided against 
itself over the interpretation of suffering. Some modes of 
suffering, say child abuse, are said (by some) to be caused by 
immoral behavior by others; others, say alcoholism, to be caused 
by the immorality of the sufferer herself; others, say racism, to 
be caused by the cultural hegemony of vindictive moral codes; and 
others yet, say terminal patients who seek to end their own lives 
because they roll in agony, to be rendered otiose by traditional 
moral codes. And we disagree within and between ourselves which 
instances fall under which categories. 
John Caputo, in a fascinating study entitled Auainst Ethics, 
seeks to cut through the abstractions of contemporary ethical 
theory. He elevates suffering itself to the center of moral 
attention. Drop punitive gods. Forget Rawls. Bypass Nietzsche's 
coldness toward suffering. Avoid entanglement in the coils of 
Derrida. Pour salt on Foucault's critique of normalization. Be 
wary of the spiritualism of Immanuel Levinas. Step outside the 
conflictual world of political partisanship. Concentrate, instead 
on suffering of the flesh, and on the obligation of those in the 
vicinity of suffering to respond to it. Let's make obligation, 
Caputo says, palpable, specific, situational, and guttural. 
Let's rescue it from theology and philosophy. Letts respond to 
suffering without mediation by a god, a Greek ideal of beauty, a 
teleological principle, a veil of ignorance, an overlapping 
consensus, or a (non)metaphysics of differance to govern the 
response. 
Obligation is not commanded on high, nor is it grounded in 
reason, nor does it filter into life through mystical experience. 
Caputo, a theologian and philosopher, has gone practical. He 
still loves the old texts. But obligation, he says , simply 
happens : 
Obligation means the obligation to the other, to one who has 
been laid low, to victims and outcasts. Obligation means the 
obligation to reduce and alleviate suffering.' 
Moral codes grounded in a law of laws, such as the commands 
of a god or the dictates of a categorical imperative, are too 
blunt, crude and closed to respond to suffering equitably. Those. 
grounded in a fictional contract are not much better. Besides, 
both types purport to ground morality in certitudes that are 
highly questionable and debatable. People spend so much time 
debating the certitudes they never get around to suffering. Even 
moralities built around appreciation of the human as an 
essentially embodied being tend to slide over suffering. Though 
they come closer. The thing to do is to move through gods, 
transcendental connnands, principles, contracts, and bodies to the 
experience of human flesh. "Flesh is soft and vulnerable. It 
tears, bleeds, swells, bends, burns, starves, grows old, 
exhausted, numb, ulcerous.... Flesh smells.112' Flesh is the soft, 
perishable medium in which suffering occurs. "What is suffering 
if not this very vulnerability of the flesh, this unremitting 
unbecoming. This liability to suffer every breakdown, reversal 
and consumpti~n?~~ ' If you bind suffering to flesh and flesh to 
obligation, you both cut through systems that try to ground 
obligation in some solid finality and you render obligation more 
sensitive to the palpable hunger, sickness, desperation, and 
helplessness humans often face. Flesh moves you from us to them, 
without complex argumentation. We are all made of it. 
Caputo knows things are not quite that simple. He knows that 
to reach the flesh it has been necessary to write an entire book 
entangled in a host of controversial arguments. But, still, he 
hopes he has built a cantilever upon which a certain amount of 
moral weight can be placed. He hopes to pull us away from 
metaphysics and systematic doctrines toward the suffering and 
obligation that both inspires the constructions of metaphysics 
and engenders its obfuscation. "Flesh fills metaphysics with 
anxiety." Flesh, first, challenges the systematicity that 
governs metaphysics. For flesh is vulnerable. It absorbs burdens, 
blows, injuries and shocks. It compromises agency. Flesh suffers. 
But the very vulnerabilities of flesh, second, often prod humans 
to construct metaphysical systems to elevate them above its 
softness, smell and bloodiness. (Caputo does not evince old 
worries about temptations of the flesh). Or it prods them to 
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embrace systems that show why limits of the flesh are deserved. 
But you never escape the flesh, and Caputo counsels you to stay 
close to it when you let obligation happen. 
Can such a recipe be followed? Caputo concedes formally that 
he reinscribes himself in the world of metaphysics even as he 
struggles to write himself out of it. For he uses an inherited 
language.' Caputo has read his Derrida. Indeed, he has written 
books on language. Nonetheless, we can stay close to the 
experience of suffering, Caputo thinks, if we strive for 
nmetaphysical rninirnali~rn.~ 
Minimalism is a metaphysics without a meta-event, a kind of 
decapitated metaphysics .... Minimalism lets events happen, 
lets them be, lets them go, without imposing grand and 
overarching schemata upon them, without simplifying them. 
It has decided to come to terms with intractable 
plurivocity . 
Caputo, I should tell you, professes to love many of the 
prophets he criticizes. He loves Abraham, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Deleuze, and Levinas for starters. Well, I happen to 
love Caputo. I love his critique of monotheistic and secular 
moralities alike. I respect his quest to bring suffering back to 
the center of ethics. I appreciate his sense of the fragility of 
obligation combined with the insight that attempts to write 
fragility out by constructing automatic foundations for ethics 
themselves foster new cruelties. I love much in his sensibility. 
But, still, Caputo, to make obligation simple, has submerged some 
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dilemmas it poses to ethics. A few blemishes remain on Caputo8s 
skin. 
His "metaphysical minimalism" is a non-starter. It contains 
some admirable ingredients, but it does not succeed in its 
objective. Rather, Caputo replaces a familiar set of metaphysical 
doctrines with an alternative that is just as fundamental. And 
Caputo does not identify anything within his perspective (within 
the perspective I share up to a point) that might ins~ire the 
spirit of obligation he pursues. You are either moved or unmoved 
by the stories Caputo tells. Obligation either lnhappensn or it 
does not. And Caputo8s "rninirnali~m~~ compels him to reduce his 
injunctions to the "1" far too often: "1 feelw; "1 avoid;" "1 
love;" "1 must." Minimalism reduces Caputo to a Christ figure 
without transcendental portfolio. Either he moves you to read 
suffering as he does, or nothing happens. 
Most significantly, Caputo8s metaphysical minimalism impels 
him to treat devastated groups and helpless individuals as 
paradium objects of obligation. Sick, homeless, helpless 
individuals. Peoples laid low by floods, conquest, famine, 
holocaust. Caputo issues a charity model of obligation, in which 
virtuous helpers are pulled by the helplessness of the needy: 
"the power of obligation varies directly with the powerlessness 
of the one who calls for help, which is the power of 
powerlessne~s.~~ 
Such situations often occur, and their moral importance is 
undeniable. But they may not pose the most difficult cases in 
ethics. Some of the most difficult cases arise when people 
suffer from injuries imposed by institutionalized identities, 
principles, and cultural understandings, when those who suffer 
are not entirely helpless but are defined as threatening, 
contagious or dangerous to the self-assurance of these 
identities, and when the sufferers honor sources of ethics 
inconsonant or disturbing to these constituencies. And this 
suffering, too, invades the flesh. It engenders fatigue; it makes 
people perish; it drives them over the edge. To simplify 
obligation in an era of political pessimism, Caputo has quietly 
emptied ethics of its political dimension. 
The most difficult cases require not an ethics of help for 
the helpless but a pol-itical ethos of critical enaaaement between 
interdependent, contending constituencies implicated in 
asymmetrical structures of power. 'Indeed, some ways of acting 
upon obligations to the deserving poor or victims of natural 
disaster provide moral cover for the refusal to cultivate an 
ethics of engagement with constituencies in more ambiguous, 
disturbing, com~etitive,positions. The most complex ethical 
issues arise in those ambiguous contexts where suffering is 
intense and the injuries suffered by some contribute to the sense 
of self-confidence, wholeness, transcendence or cultural desert 
of others. That is, the most pressing, difficult cases of ethics 
are political in character. They often revolve around what I will . 
call the politics of becoming. 
The politics of becoming occurs when a culturally marked 
constituency, suffering under the its current social 
constitution, strives to reconfigure itself by moving the 
cultural constellation of identity\difference then in place. In 
such situations either the condition of the subjugated 
constituency or the response required to open up a new line of 
flight is not acknowledged by some of the parties involved. And 
sometimes by none. Under these circumstances it takes a militant, 
experimental and persistent political movemen* to open up a line 
of flight from culturally induced suffering. Such a-movement, to 
succeed, must extend from those who initiate cultural experiments 
to others who respond sensitively to those experiments even while -
they disturb their'own sense of identity. 
I honor, then, the politics of becoming, not the politics of 
realization of an essence or universal condition already known in 
its basic structure by reasonable people. Indians, slaves, 
feminists, Jews, homosexuals, and secularists, among others, have 
participated in the politics of becoming in the last couple of 
centuries in Euro-American societies. But many citizens who now 
acknowledge the fruits of these movements, who repudiate the 
negative marks inscribed upon such constituencies in the past, 
also forget how the politics of becoming proceeds when it is in 
motion. They treat retrospective intepretations of the politics 
of becoming as if these definitions and standards were actually 
or "implicitly" available to participants when things were in 
motion. They act as if the initiating constituency either exposed 
hvnocrisv in the profession of universal rights by dominant 
groups or prompted a cultural dialectic that fills out the 
implicit logic of the universal. They reduce the politics of 
becoming to a social logic. 
Caputo is wary of both the model of hypocrisy and the model 
of dialectical progress. I am with him here. But his minimalist 
response to these two metaphysics flattens out the modes of 
suffering he can recognize. Caputors perspective does appear 
"minimaln by comparison to the models of a commanding, 
(Christian) god and/or a teleological principle, Measured by 
these two perspectives, it lacks a god and lacks reference to a 
fundamental purpose of being. Lacking these supports Caputo is 
pressed to give (apparently) simple examples of suffering and to 
make obligation just "happen." 
The two interdependent traditions Caputo resists only appear 
to exhaust metaphysics if meta is (mis)translated as wbeyondw.e 
For then meta-physics would inform you what precedes the physical 
world. Perhaps a god or an intrinsic purpose. But if you 
construe metaphysics.to be any reading of the fundamental 
character of things, it becomes clear that every positive 
cultural interpretation is inhabited by a metaphysical dimension. 
The call to metaphysical minimalism now becomes either a command 
to conceal the perspective that moves you or a doomed attempt to 
live, act, judge, and respond without engaging in positive 
interpretation. 
Caputo takes a step in the direction I endorse when he 
speaks of an "intractable plurivocityn coursing through things. 
But his drive to minimalism stops him from pursuing this thought. 
Does he lament the loss of a god who could communicate clear 
commands or draw us closer to the fundamental design of things? 
His critical reading of Nietzsche suggests this possibility, 
anyway; for Caputo reduces the thinker who pursued the theme of 
fundamental plurivocity more fully than anyone preceding him in 
the West to a visionary of a cold, cruel, world who is 
indifferent to suffering. Often Caputo simply bypasses the 
element of joyfulness, abundance and possibility Nietzsche 
locates in the multiplicity of being; and the Nietzschean 
generosity he does acknowledge is never pure enough to fit the 
disinterested model of obligation Caputo demands. 
My Nietzsche offers a positive metaphysic that breaks with 
the familiar options of theism, secularism and metaphysical 
minimalism. He does so to fend off the "passive nihilismw that 
so readily accompanies the liquid diet of metaphysical 
minimalism, to fend off, that is, the cultural enervation that 
readily accompanies the doomed attempt to live without 
interpreting life actively. Nietzsche affirms that action is 
impossible without interpretation, that every particular 
interpretation invokes a fundamental conception of the world, and 
that every interpretive perspective remains questionable and 
contestable. He affirms, that is, life, in its ambiguous 
conditions of possibility. So Nietzsche interprets actively from 
within a distinctive reading of the fundaments of things. Here is 
one formulation of those fundaments, offered by his sidekick 
Zarathustra, while preaching about "Old and New Tabletsu: 
When the water is spanned by planks, when bridges and 
railings leap over the.river, verily those are believed who 
say, 'Everything is in.flux....' But when the winter 
comes..., then verily, not only the blockheads say, 'Does 
not everything stand still?' 
'At bottom everything stands stillR--that is truly a winter 
doctrine ... 0 my brothers is everything not in flux now? 
Have not all railings and bridges fallen into the water? Who 
could still cling to 'goodf and 'evilf?... The thawing wind 
blows--thus preach in every street my brothers.'' 
Several thoughts mingle in Zarathustra's saying. First, 
things are mobile at bottom, rather than still or fixed, This 
experience of the mobility of things has profound, corrosive 
effects upon winter conceptions of nature, divinity, identity, 
truth and ethics that have prevailed in the West. 
Second, winter thoughts keep reinstating themselves in ways 
that treat the cultural ice as if it were frozen all the way 
down. This drive to find a solid bottom is particularly powerful 
when suffering is intense or profound. For sufferers often seek 
relief from the riddle of suffering, and they often find solace 
when things appear still at the bottom. Suffering readily fosters 
winter doctrines, But, sometimes, as in the case of Nietzsche, 
individuals struggle against these pressures to come to terms 
critically with the existential needs impelling them in this 
direction. They then struggle to gauge the cruelties and 
exclusions that regularly accompany the hegemony of winter 
doctrines. 
Third, Zarathustrafs perspective is paradoxical and 
contestable. He can point to multiple disturbances and surprises 
that disrupt each new winter doctrine; he can provide pointers to 
a mobility of things that exceeds the reach of cognition. But he 
cannot freeze this contestable experience of flux in truth. 
Truth cannot be a relation of correspondence for Nietzsche. Truth 
changes its place as well as its meaning in his thought. fTruthf, 
in one of its valences, is those indispensable cultural 
productions that freeze things (representations of nature, 
identities, moral codes, etc) temporarily and incompletely. 
Truth, as solidification, occurs in a "regime of truth," as 
Foucault would say. On another register--for Nietzsche plays with 
'truthf--the Nietzschean true the flux out of which 
solidifications occur in society and nature (for nature is not 
finished), the surplus and noise that circulate through every 
solid formation and create possibilities for new becomings. 
Truth, so rendered, casts off the dimension of final soliditv so 
crucial to the correspondence model while retaining the dimension 
of fundamentalitv also invoked by that model. The true becomes 
unsusceptible to correspondence. By disaggregating two elements 
the correspondence model binds together Nietzsche recovers an 
alternative orientation to truth. Along this dimension, 
Nietzsche is closer to a-theologies of god(s) as absence, excess 
or ,nothingr than to secular conceptions of truth as 
correspondence, coherence, rational consensus or pragmatic 
success. 
Fourth, Nietzsche and Zarathustra tap into this fugitive and 
cognitively indirect experience of the protean diversity of life, 
cultivating for the rich abundance of life. They 
cultivate gratitude toward the abundance of being that endows 
life with mobility, They cultivate gratitude both to life and to 
the excess that provides one of its conditions of possibility, 
Such a gratitude is nreligiousw without necessarily being 
theistic. It finds more intense expression at some times than 
others. "What is astonishing about the religiosity of the ancient 
Greeks is the lavish abundance of gratitude that radiates from 
it. Only a very distinguished type of human being stands in that 
relation to nature and to life. Later, when the rabble came to 
rule in Greece, fear choked out religion and prepared the way for 
christianity . l1 
Gratitude for the abundance of life, then, carries 
acceptance of a contestable conception of being into ethics and 
politics. But this temperament is not located beyond the play of 
identities, understandings, and principles. Rather, it is 
inserted into these media, rendering them more responsive to that 
which exceeds them, more generous and refined in their 
engagements with difference. Without the infusion of such 
gratitude, high sounding principles will be applied in stingy, 
punitive ways. A theistic or secular perspective that exudes it 
can foster ethical generosity while trimming some cognitive fat 
from its theological or secular diet. 
This contestable faith in the abundance of being, this 
impious, nontheistic reverence for life, can render a post- 
secular ethic both alert to the fragility of ethics and open to 
the play of difference in cultural life." These two dispositions 
support one another. Those inspired by an ethos of generosity 
participate in the politics of becoming without having to ground 
their ethic in something solid, fixed or frozen. Because we can 
act ethically without being commanded by a god or transcendental 
imperative to do so, we can also deploy genealogy, 
deconstruction, and political disturbance to cultivate 
responsiveness to movements of difference. Our commitment to 
.these activities does not dissolve ethics: it only does so for 
those who ca'nnot be ethical without solid foundations. We do not 
have to pretend that obligation just happens either. Acceptance 
of obligation grows out of a protean care for the world that 
precedes it..Indeed, the demand for purity in obligation strips 
it of implication inside those human identities and interests 
that might mobilize it as an active force. For to retreat to the 
view that "obligation happensm is to retain the Christian form of 
obligation as obedience while stripping off the transcendental 
command that authorizes it. 
A post-secular ethic thus situates itself within the 
discordant experience of the indis~ensabilitv constitutive 
fraaility of ethics. It renounces the assurance of solid grounds 
to enable it to explore unnecessary and injurious limits to life 
supported by the very provision of such assurances. Those who 
participate in such an ethos cultivate critical generosity to 
those differences upon which the specification of their own 
identities depend, in part by responding to those differences 
outside that are regulated in themselves to enable,them to be 
what they are and in part by recalling that they inhabit a world 
where the admirable possibilities of being outstrip the time and 
corporeal capacity of any particular individual or culture to 
embody them all. 
Fifth, the first four themes do not make Nietzsche 
indifferent toward suffering. They drive him to make a crucial 
division within suffering. He resists pity for those who demand a 
winter doctrine that redeems the suffering that comes with life 
or proves how human beings deserve to be punished. For such 
doctrines express ressentiment. They express persistent 
resentment against the flesh, pain, limited capacity to know, 
vulnerability to disorganization and susceptibility to death that 
mark the human condition. They thereby resent conditions of 
possibility for human life itself. This existential resentment 
infiltrates into stingy moral ideals, conceptions of truth, 
practices of identity, judgments of normality, and systems of 
punishment. Every individual and culture struggles with 
ressentiment, according to Nietzsche. And every generous 
disposition issues in resentment, anger, or fear on occasion. 
Indeed, such responses are sometimes appropriate to specific 
circumstances. But moral dispositions governed by ressentiment 
regularize war against the diversity of life in the quest to 
transcendentalize what they already are or pretend to be. Or so 
my Nietzsche thinks. 
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My Nietzsche resists pity for those who demand a 
transcendental. reason for suffering. Secularists, on this 
reading, too often join too many theists in placing such demands 
on being. (There is no doctrinal imperative, recall, that either 
party must do so). This demand finds expression in the 
conceptions of truth, reason, justice, and nature they insist 
upon without being able to prove. Pity for existential suffering 
too often squashes individuality, distinctiveness, nobility and 
difference under the stars of universality, metaphysical 
necessity, and civilizational regularity. The problem is that the 
first sort of pity seldom articulates itself exactly as Nietzsche 
defines it. It often takes cover under rubrics of love, universal 
principle, desert, freedom and civilizational necessity. It must 
be sniffed out before it can be combatted. 
Moreover, some forms of suffering provide conditions of 
possibility for admirable achievements. The refinement and 
maintenance of a mode of individuality, for example, requires 
considerable work by the self on the self. And its very 
particularity carries losses with it. "How is freedom measured, 
in individuals as in nations? By the resistance which has to be 
overcome, by the effort it costs to stay aloft." I' Every way of 
being involves considerable work to maintain itself--to stay 
aloft--and too many individuals and groups both resent this 
condition of life and take revenge against others who seem not to 
require the same combination of reaulations restraints &Q 
what thev are. The key is to work to stop the suffering tied to 
staying aloft from fueling resentment against external 
expressions.of differences regulated in you which allow you to be 
what you are. 
That being said, it must be emphasized that (my) Nietzsche 
is not against pity or compassion per se, despite what Caputo and 
several other commentators suggest. He resists compassion for 
selective modes of suffering to express it actively for others. 
As he puts the point: it is wcompassion, in other words, against 
compassionfW one type of compassion against another. l4 Nietzsche 
pits compassion for that suffocated by the normalizing politics 
of "good and evilw against compassion for existential suffering. 
The latter compassion must be redirected, and the demand to which 
it responds must be overcome, if an ethic of generosity in 
relations of identity\difference is to be cultivated. Nietzsche 
might have striven to develop more respectful distance from the 
mode of suffering he finds most offensive and dangerous. But he, 
like everyone else in this respect, is com~elled to be selective 
with respect to suffering. His open selectivity challenges 
concealed principles of selection in other moral perspectives. Is 
it because his selectivity pits him against powerful currents 
flowing through sacred and secular moralities in western 
societies that representatives of these traditions so often read 
him to be against compassion and benevolence per se? 
There are plenty of ways I dissent from (my) Nietzsche: His 
cultural aristocraticism, which prizes becoming and plurality 
among a tlnoblett (though often unmonied) few while condemning "the 
herdw to a cultural dogmatism it is said to be predisposed 
toward; his (sometimes appealing) fantasy to reside on the margin 
of society beyond the reach of organized politics; his tendency 
.... 
(following from the first two themes) to neglect the politics of 
becoming in favor of cultivating individual distinctiveness; his 
profound ambivalence toward the basis and effects of gender 
duality; his periodic delight in petty cruelty against carriers 
of ressentiment (though I feel some ambivalence here); etc. I do 
not, then, endorse numerous themes represented today under the 
name #Nietzschet, but I do subscribe to the five stated above. 
Call them if you wish, my ndemocratization of Nietzsche*. I 
doubt whether I could enunciate them without drawing considerable 
sustenance from the work of Nietzsche. IS And I suspect that some 
who reduce their Nietzsche to some ugly mixture of coldness, 
indifference and cruelty do so to suppress these themes 
themselves from ethical discourse, sinking them in filth so as to 
return ethical authority to the narrow, formal, stingy options 
with which they began. 
The Politics of ~ecominq 
By the politics of becoming I mean that paradoxical politics 
by which new cultural identities are formed out of old energies, 
injuries, and differences. The politics of becoming emerges out 
of the energies, suffering and lines of flight available to 
culturally defined differences in a particular historical 
constellation. To the extent it succeeds in placing a new 
identity on the cultural field the politics of becoming changes 
the shape and contour of established identities as well. The 
politics of becoming thus sows disturbance and distress in the 
souls of those disrupted by its movement. In a (modern?) world 
where people are marked and known through their identities, 
difference and becoming are ubiquitous. If each positive identity 
is organized through the differences it demarcates, if difference 
circulates through it as well as around it, if movement by some 
of these differences compromises its quest to present itself as 
natural, transcendent, complete or self-sufficient, then the 
politics of becoming imperils the stability of being through 
which dominant constituencies are coddled and comf~rted.~~ The
question of ethics emerges within this complex set of relations. 
If becoming is as fundamental to life as being, the question 
becomes: which sort of suffering is most worthy of responsiveness 
in which contexts, that which the politics of becoming imposes on 
the stability, of being or that which established identities 
impose upon the movement of differences to protect their 
stability? In contemporary American culture the operational 
answer often precedes the question. Here, frozen codes of 
morality and normality weigh in heavily on the side of being, 
stasis, and stability without acknowledging how the moral scales 
are tipped. And this is probably true more generally as well. To 
attend to the politics of becoming is to shift the cultural 
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balance between being and becoming without attempting the 
impossible, self-defeating goal of dissolving solid formations 
altogether. 
The politics of becoming is paradoxical. A new cultural 
identity emerges out of old injuries and differences. But 
because there is not an eternal model it copies as it moves 
toward new definition, and because it meets resistance from 
identities counting upon its neediness or marginality to secure 
themselves, the end result of the politics of becoming is seldom 
clear at its inception. Indeed, becoming proceeds from inchoate 
injuries and hopes that may not be crisply defined until a new 
identity has been forged through which to measure those injuries 
retros~ectivelv. 
If and as a stigmatized identity attains a more positive 
standing, it may exaggerate to say that it has arrived at what it 
truly is. at bottom or in essence. No positive identity can be 
judged final in a world where things are mobile at bottom. Of 
course, it is also hard not to pretend such a final state has 
been approximated. The presumptions of (at least) European 
languages press in this direction. So do persistent human 
interests in regularity of expectation and stability of judgment. 
But a successful movement of becoming stirs up this cultural 
field of identities, standards, and procedures; therebv alters 
to some dearee measure & which its previous sufferinq -- 
the res~onsibilitv of others to & are culturallv defined. -
Moreover, the new movement, if it is not squashed, sets up new 
23 
intrasubjective and intersubjective differences. It might thereby 
enable some new positive possibilities by engendering new modes 
of intrasubjective and intersubjective suffering not yet 
crystallized as injuries. Perhaps it is wise to assume that 
admirable modes of being tend to crowd each other out in a world 
not predesigned to house all together. Perhaps, too, suffering of 
the flesh is somewhat less variable within and across cultures 
than the formation of positive identities. These two premonitions 
inform those who seek to come to terms ethically with the 
constitutive tension between the powers of being and the energies 
of becoming. 
The politics of becoming is purposive without being 
teleological. It engages actors who, as they pursue a line of 
flight, do not remain sufficiently fixed across time to be marked 
as consistent and masterful agents. Those who initiate the 
politics of becoming make a difference without knowing quite what 
they are doing. In this respect they amplify underappreciated 
dimensions within human agency in general. 
The politics of becoming requires specific conditions of 
possibility. It flourishes in a culture that incorporates most of 
its members into the good life it enables, that is already 
pluralistic to a considerable degree, and that has cultivated an 
ethos of critical responsiveness to new drives to pluralization. 
Here many constituencies appreciate a little more actively the 
uncertain element of contingency in their own constitution, and 
this discernment informs their responses to movements by alter- 
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identities to reconstitute the terms of their cultural 
identification. The responding constituencies recognize that to 
create space for the politics of becoming they must render 
themselves available to modification in one way or another. They 
convert cultural disturbance of what they are into energy to 
respond reflectively to new lines of flight. If they are 
pluralists, they appraise each new drive to identity first 
according to the likelihood it will support a culture of 
pluralism in the future. 
An ethos of responsiveness to becoming is never entirely 
reducible to obedience to a pre-existing moral code. Some 
elements in the existing code itself must be modified if space is 
to be created for something new to emerge. In a pluralizing 
culture two interdependent dimensions of ethics are perpetually 
poised in tension: the obliaation to abide by the existing moral 
code and cultivation of an ethos of critical responsiveness to 
the movement of difference. Without a code, the regularity of 
judqent deserved and expected by existing constituencies would 
be lost. But a congealed code also poses d d ,  arbitrary barriers 
to the politics of becoming. This is what Nietzsche means by the 
nimm~rality of morality." While a moral code is indispensable to 
Social regulation, judgment, and coordination, it is also too 
crude, blunt, and blind an authority to carry out these functions 
sensitively and automatically. An ethos of critical 
responsiveness, when active, navigates between these 
interdependent and discordant dimensions of ethical life. 
In American life historical examples of the politics of 
becoming can be found in anti-slave movements, feminism, 
gay/lesbian rights movements, the introduction of secularism, the 
effort to place "Judeon in front of the "Christian traditionN, 
the right to die, and so on. But few participants in such 
movements interpret themselves entirely through the politics of 
becoming. Many claim to pursue an essence that has been 
culturally occluded or to fill out a universal set of rights that 
contain hypocritical exclusions. Yet, some difficulties speak 
against these essentialist self-interpretations: they often 
create implacable conflicts between contenders for the title of 
the natural, true or intrinsic identity; they underplay the work -
required to cultivate generosity in social relations by 
pretending the end they pursue is already im~licit in the 
culture; they discourage winners of one round from coming to 
terms actively with the contingency of their own identity, 
thereby setting the stage for a new round of resistances to the 
politics of becoming by newly dogmatized identities; and they. 
discourage cultivation of gratitude toward the rich ambiguity of 
life, a gratitude that sustains responsiveness to the politics of 
becoming. 
There is always a new round in the politics of becoming. 
For, in a world where things are mobile at bottom, Being, as 
stable essence, never arrives. Let us set these general 
formulations in the context of a couple of contemporary examples, 
examples still poised in the uncertain space between obscure 
suffering and the possible consolidation of something new. 
Jan Clausen is a beneficiary of and participant in gay and 
lesbian movements in America. Because of them it became more 
feasible to establish sensual relations .with women without self- 
hate and without encountering quite as much social stigmatization 
as heretofore. She knows these collective achievements are 
partial and precarious. But through them she has developed a 
critique of "essentialist thinkingn and come to terms more 
actively with the constructed, conflicted, and sometimes mobile 
character of sexual identity. While "socially powerful groups 
have a stake in promoting the illusion of unconflicted identity 
because maintenance of their power depends on keeping in place a 
constellation of apparently fixed, 'natural', immutable social 
relationships," Clausen joins others in engaging the "resistance 
to identity which lies at the very heart of psychic life." l7 The 
community she belonged to until recently believes, for example, 
that both "heterose~uality~~ and nhomosexualityn are complex 
organizations of sensual energy rather than cultural fixtures to 
be graded according to a natural scale of normality and 
abnormality. 
Clausen, though, recently found that this collective 
knowledge did her little good when her affections shifted from a 
woman to a man. She faced charges of betrayal and responses of 
rejection strangely reminiscent of those she had encountered in 
disturbing the code of heterosexual normality. These responses 
were understandable, given the beleaguered condition of gay and , 
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lesbian communities. Still, they may point to powerful tendencies 
in most cultural groupings.to naturalize what they are; they may 
suggest how the naturalization of identity functions 
simultaneously to protect collective bonds, to provide security 
for certain individuals, and to create hardships for those whose 
contingent condensation of life and desire does not fit into 
defined cultural slots. 
Clausenrs "interesting conditionw shows how the politics of 
becoming at one'historical junction regularly solidifies into a 
mode of being at another, For Clausen, alert to a fluidity of 
desire that may settle for a time and then start moving again, 
needs a new social movement to modify one she still identifies 
with to a considerable degree. Clausen's interesting condition , 
enables her to amplify a common, though rather subterranean, 
experience of ambiguity and resistance within identity. It 
encourages her, therefore, to become more responsive to 
alternative sensualities struggling to form themselves within the 
social matrix. Out of such a series of intersections between old 
and new participants in the politics of becoming she can hope for 
a new cultural coalition to bestow greater ethical attention upon 
becoming itself, As she puts it, experience "in a particular 
community of women convinces me that all human connections are 
risky, fragmentary, and non-ideal;" but participation in 
coalitions between disparate social constituencies connected by 
multiple knots of affinity and sympathy also convinces Clausen of 
the possibility of people combining together wfrom incredibly 
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different places" from time to time to vindicate the politics of 
becoming. l8 
Mrs. Lin, a daughter of Chinese intellectuals who died while 
being abused during the Cultural Revolution in China, is in a 
more abject situation. Her tlsymptomsw include headaches, 
difficulty sleeping, poor appetite, low energy, anxiety, and 
fantasies of death. They lead to the diagnosis of neurasthenia by 
Chinese psychiatrists, while they might issue.in the diagnosis of 
depression in the United States. 
For a North American psychiatrist, Mrs. Lin meets 
the..criteria for a major depressive.disorder. The Chinese 
psychiatrists..did not deny she was depressed, but they 
regarded the depression as a manifestation of neurasthenia.. 
Neurasthenia--a syndrome of exhaustion, weakness, and 
diffuse bodily complaints, believed to be caused by 
inadequate physical energy in the central nervous system--is 
an official diagnosis in China; but it is not a diagnosis in 
the American Psychiatric Ass~ciation,~~ latest nosol~gy.~~ 
Arthur Kleinman, a medical anthropologist with degrees in 
medicine and psychiatry as well, doubts that either diagnosis 
fits the case perfectly.= While the first focuses on bodily 
symptoms and the second on psychological states, neither pays 
much attention to the complex intersections between social 
stress, corporeal experience, and professional diagnoses of the 
symptoms that issue from this combination. And ~leinman's 
extensive interviews with Mrs. Lin convince him that her 
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situation cannot be "diagnosedn until the stresses, punishments 
and dislocations imposed upon her as a cultural dissident are 
drawn into the diagnosis. If they are included, the prescribed 
responses to Mrs. Lints condition will include changes in the 
system of social stress and surveillance in which her suffering 
occurs. Psychiatry will become more explicitly engaged in the 
political context in which it is always already set. 
In the United States, too, there is considerable resistance 
to a cultural broadening of psychiatric perspective. It would 
require psychiatrists to explore complex relations between social 
stress and bodily experience, to study how corporealization of 
cultural experience occurs, to explore general limits to the 
human bodyts tolerance of stress, disruption, fixed routine and 
so on, and to reflect upon the connections between contemporary 
practices of medical diagnosis and the professional identities 
psychiatrists themselves seek to maintain. It would implicate 
psychiatrists in wider political debates from which the 
medicalization of suffering and illness may now insulate them. 
Mrs. Lin, and her equivalents in the States, need a political 
movement to reconfigure the psychiatric approach to mental 
disorder. Such a politics of becoming would profit from recent 
movements in the States that sharpened awareness of complex 
interconnections between social stress, human suffering, medical 
diagnosis and medical treatment in the domains of race, gender 
and sexuality. 
Any such movement would be filled with uncertainty and risk, 
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of course. Even Arthur Kleinman shies away from it. His last 
chapter is not entitled "Social Movements and the Psychiatric 
Sensibility," but "What Relationship Should Psychiatry Have to 
Social Science?" The latter is doubtless an important topic* But 
it stretches the experience of psychiatry while remaining within 
the bounds of academic interdisciplinarity. Kleinman, I suspect, 
would be responsive to a new political movement to connect 
psychiatry, social stress, and corporeal experience, a movement 
that opened up new investigations in psychiatry by altering the 
cultural pressures in which it occurs. His subject position, 
however, makes it difficult to initiate such a,politics of 
becoming. 
Justice and the Politics a Becoming 
The element of paradox in the politics of becoming is that 
before success.a new movement is.typically judged by the terms 
through which it is currently depreciated and after success a new 
identity emerges that exceeds the energies and identifications 
that called it into being. We are morally primed to expect a new 
identity to precede our recognition of it; but, given the paradox 
of becoming, the way in which this moral expectation closes off 
lines of flight from suffering often turns out retrospectively to 
be immoral. An ethos of critical responsiveness negotiates these 
discordant imperatives: it ushers new identities through the 
barriers normality and morality pose to becoming. Participants in 
such an ethos appreciate how something admirable might become out 
of obscurity or difference. Critical responsiveness is 
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anticipatory, critical and self-revisionary in character. 
Critical responsiveness is antici~atorv, in that it responds 
to pressures to become even before they have condensed into a 
firm, definite identity. It also subjects the politics of 
becoming to,critical appraisal, alert to the possibility a new 
movement might congeal into a fundamentalism that forecloses the 
future becoming or might force certain constituencies into an 
abject position. Finally, and most crucially, critical 
respondents engage in practices of'self-revision as they respond 
to the politics of becoming. For example, when heterosexuals 
endorse diverse sensualities they also acknowledge that 
heterosexuality is neither firmly grounded in the universality of 
nature nor the automatic outcome of normal sensual development. 
And for whites to challenge established assumptions of racial 
difference is to come to terms with how wwhitenessm has been 
culturally constructed by aligning diverse skin shades and tones 
with a set of social privileges, a gender graded code of 
parenthood, and middle class  expectation^.^' Critical 
responsiveness to the claims of difference calls forth a partial 
and comparative denaturalization of the respondents themelves; it 
also opens up possible lines of mobility in what you already are. 
These effects are possible because every effective movement of 
difference moves the identities through which it has been 
differentiated. It is thus not surprising that the time in which 
politics on behalf of the pluralization of identities intensifies 
is also the time in which counter drives to the 
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fundamentalization of disturbed identities also becomes tempting. 
consider, then, the ambiguous relation the practice of 
justice bears to the politics of becoming. The politics of 
becoming repositions selected modes of suffering so that they 
move from an obscure subsistence or marked identity below the 
register of justice to a visible, unmarked place on it. In a 
modern world of justice as fairness between persons. this means 
that modes of being consciously or unconsciously shuffled below 
normal personhood become modified and translated into the dense 
operational rubric of personhood itself. A mode of suffering is 
thereby moved from below the reach of justice to a place within 
its purview, and now the language of injury, discrimination, 
injustice, and oppression can apply more cleanly to it. It is 
after a movement crosses this critical threshold that a mode of 
suffering becomes unjust. 
Thus, the coarse practice of justice regularly poses 
barriers to the politics of becoming before providing support for 
it. Failure by some liberal theorists to acknowledge the 
fundamental ambiguity in the center of justice disables them from 
registering the importance of an ethos of responsiveness to 
justice itself. This does not mean that the politics of being 
(justice, common standards, shared understandings, etc) is 
irrelevant to ethico-political action. It does mean that the 
"wers" who act together are more pluralized than some traditions 
recognize and are susceptible to periodic movement through the 
politics of becoming. 
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Take John Rawls. Rawls promises to adjudicate between just 
and unjust claims. He encounters several difficulties in 
fulfilling this promise, including the inability to decide 
whether his exclusions of animals, nature, and mentally retarded 
humans from the scales of justice exposes limits to his theory 
or the relative unimportance of these issues to the public life 
of a just society. I will concentrate here, though, on two ways 
in which the Rawlsian rendering of "personsn engaged in "fair 
cooperationg1 poses ill considered barriers to the politics of 
becoming. 
Rawls now concurs that justice as fairness cannot be derived 
from the calculations of rational agents. The outcome of rational 
calculation depends upon the premises adopted. Self-interest, for 
instance, does not serve as a sufficient basis for justice. "What 
rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility 
that underlies the desire to engage in fair cooperation as 
What else is needed, then? Well, agents of justice are 
"reasonablew people. They are willing to accept reciprocal 
limits. The word "reasonablen may suggest that this sensibility 
is a sibling of rationality, while it is actually a kissing 
cousin of traditional theories of virtue.23 For by what procedure 
or mode of argument is reasonableness attained? On what logic is 
it grounded? Rawls says the disposition comes from a fortunate 
cultural tradition that already embodies it. It is nested, that 
is, within cultural practices never entirely reducible to a logic 
or rationality. 
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Note that Rawlsians are now unable to find the sufficient 
basis for justice they habitually accuse post-Nietzscheans of 
lacking. Reasonableness finds its grounds in itself if and when 
it is already widely shared. But what does a Rawlsian moralist 
appeal to when such a tradition is deeply conflictual, or weak, 
or active in some domains and absent in others? What do ~awlsians 
appeal to, that is, when the appeal is most needed? Rawls has 
nothing compelling to say in such cases. This is because, in a 
way reminiscent of Caputo, Richard Rorty and Jurgen Habermas, he 
rules "comprehensive doctrinesn out of public discourse to 
protect the impartiality of justice. But the Rawlsian imperative 
to silence at such junctures has become a dangerous eccentricity. 
Since every other contemporary constituency articulates soem of 
its most fundamental presumptions in its public presentations, 
the eccentric liberalism of John Rawls marginalizes liberals on 
the most hotly contested issues of the day. Sure, they still 
claim that unreasonable people explicitly refuse what their 
conduct in other domains nimplicitlyw presumes. But, given the 
slack, uncertainty and slipperiness within the operational terms 
of public discourse, there is always room.to slip out of such a 
putative logic of social implication when people are motivated to 
do soO2' The moral power of the logic of cultural implication 
itself grows out of the sensibility it purports to sustain. Rawls 
himself occasionally recognizes this point, though he does not 
apply it to this domain. The reasonableness Rawlsian justice 
requires rests upon movable conventions disconnected from any 
"comprehensive doctrinen of the human condition. 
Post-Nietzschean gratitude for life and its ambiguous 
conditions of possibility, while not widely thematized today, 
does speak at exactly the juncture where Rawlsians lapse into 
silence. Moreover, it challenges all the way down the 
presumptions of the theistic and secular fundamentalisms Rawls 
himself resists.25 For this fundamental perspective anticipates 
noise, surplus and inchoate energy coursing over and through 
every winter doctrine. It draws an ethos of generosity from the 
cloudy atmosphere in which established conventions and identities 
are set rather than resting it on a fictive ground or binding it 
entirelv to the existing shape of those conventions themselves. 
It therefore has resources to draw upon in fighting cultural 
forces disposed to the moral negation, punishment or 
marginalization of differences that disrupt their sense of 
naturalness or self-assurance. Nor is it pressed to hide ugly 
forces within contemporary life behind a veil of ignorance to 
protect the fiction that existing conventions sufficiently 
sustain the cultural background (the wreasonablenessn) justice 
requires. And, of course, the very presumption of irreducible 
surplud alerts post-Nietzscheans to M e  insufficiency of justice 
to itself and, therefore, to the need to cultivate critical 
responsiveness to the politics of becoming. 
The second, most direct way in which Rawls forecloses the 
politics of becoming follows from his conception of the person. 
The loss of traditional grounds for "the good" means, Rawls says, 
that justice must be insulated as much as possible from 
irresolveable debates over the good. So Rawls seeks a fixed 
conception of persons appropriate to justice as an internal 
practice, dependent only on the (supposedly modest) externality 
of cultural reasonableness. Sure, Rawlsians say a thin conception 
of the person allows concrete persons to develop rich, individual 
selves. But the very formality of this permission obscures how 
dense cultural differentiations and hierarchical rankings of 
t m e s  of self (identities) precede and shape the practice of 
justice. It deflects ethical attention from thick cultural 
determinations of what is already inside, marginal to, and 
excluded from personhood before justice as fairness appears on 
the scene. A veil of ignorance thus screens the ethical 
importance of becoming from the practice of justice. 
This way of putting the point exaggerates slightly. Rawls 
now emphasizes how the fortunate becoming of liberalism out of a 
historically specific "modus vivendi" forms an indispensable 
background to justice as fairness. And this thought about the 
ethicization of a modus vivendi contains valuable possibilities. 
But this is the last historical moment the politics a -
becominq his cateuories allow him to acknowledue. Rawls wants to 
freeze the liberal conception of the person today while 
everything else in and around it undergoes change. The result is 
to surround justice with a stingier sensibility than Rawls 
intends. Persons just are, for Rawls, at least after the modus 
vivendi of liberalism. 
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No constructivist view, including Scanlon8s, says that the 
facts that are relevant in practical reasoning and judgment 
are constructed, any more than they say that the conceptions 
of person and society are constru~ted.~ 
Then he states the implications of this theme for the injustice 
of slavery: 
In claiming that slavery is unjust the relevant fact about 
it is not when it arose historically, or even whether it is 
economically efficient, but that it allows some.persons to 
own others as their property. That & a fact about slaverv, 
alreadv there. so to s~eak. and .independent of the 
principles of justice. The idea of constructing facts seems 
incoherent.= 
Rawls levels persons to make social facts simple, and he 
pursues these two agendas to secure an unequivocal conception of 
justice. But the most relevant moral fact about slavery, to 
slaveholders and defenders, was that slaves did not count as full 
persons. They could accept the Rawlsian formula of fairness to 
persons while contesting its application to slaves. Rawls would 
say that they were simply wrong in this respect: his judgment 
fits the facts while slaveholders misrepresented them. There is 
something to this point. But in treating this retrospective 
judgment as if it were a timeless and sufficient paradigm, Rawls 
' again buries two crucial dimensions in the politics of becoming: 
1) the contemporary importance of dense, institutionally embedded 
discriminations between conditions that cross the threshold of 
personhood and numerous culturally defined afflictions, 
inferiorities, liabilities, disorders and defects that fall, to 
one degree or another, below this threshold and 2) the 
contempoary importance of political performances and enactments 
in breaking up, moving or challenging dense codes of cultural 
presumption that always surround and inhabit us. Thus: Slaves 
were said to be inhabited by natural inferiorities that pushed 
them below the threshold of full persons; John Brown, the 
abolitionist, was widely declared to be a monomaniac, a type, I 
believe, no longer recognized in the official nosology of 
psychiatry; women were said to be equipped for the immediate 
ethics of family life but not for the abstract deliberations 
essential to public life; atheists were (and still are) said 
(e-g. by Tocqueville and the America he registered) to be too 
materialistic, narcissistic and selfish to hold public office, 
though they were persons enough to participate in employment, 
commerce and military liability; nhomosexualsll were (are) said to 
deserve justice as persons and to be marked by an objective 
disorder and/or sin shuffling their sensualities below the reach 
of justice; npost-modernistsn (who now occupy the subject 
position once reserved for atheists) are said to be cool, amoral, 
and anti-humanist, lacking the pre-requisites to be taken 
seriously as moral agents; doctors who assist terminally ill 
patients die were (and often are) defined as murderers because of 
the generic Christian injunction against taking one's own life; 
and Rawls himself now treats the mentally retarded as something 
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less than full persons because they cannot participate fully in 
the practice of "fair cooperationw upon which his scheme of 
justice rests. 
Rawls is superb at acknowledging the justice of newly 
defined claims and constituencies once the politics of becoming 
has carried their voices within range of his hearing. And within 
a period of thirty years or so Rawlsians have acknowledged the 
claims of Indians, women and gays after a series of social 
movements began to reshape the complex cultural identifications 
in which they are set. But Rawls pretends (and his categories 
presume) that he is now in the same position with respect to a 
large variety of unpoliticized injuries today that he is with 
respect to constituencies whose cultural identification and 
institutional standing have been changed through the politics of 
becoming. And he also acts as if his own identity (as personn) 
can remain untouched and unchanged as he responds to new 
movements of difference. 
The point is not to criticize previous noversightsn of 
Rawlsians, as if we have a god's eye view above the fray that 
they lack. Such a model of moral criticism would merelv reiterate 
Rawlsian insensitivitv to the politics & becomina. The point, 
rather, is to press Rawlsians (and others they stand in for) to 
cultivate a bi-valent ethical sensibilitv resmnsive both to 
indis~ensabilitv of justice and the radical insufficiency of 
justice to itself. For it is extremely probable that all of us 
today are unattuned to some modes of suffering and exclusion that 
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will have become ethically important tomorrow after a political 
movement carries them across the threshold of cultural 
attentiveness and redefinition. This is so because each 
effective movement of difference toward a new, legitimate 
identity breaks a constituent in its previous composition that 
located it beyond the operational reach of justice by rendering 
it immoral, inferior, hysterical, unnatural, abnormal, 
irresponsible, monomaniacal, narcissistic, or. sick. 
Often enough, of course, such a movement does not succeed; 
and sometimes it should not. Many conclude that they have good 
reason to refuse some of its claims, even after the movement 
opens up previously concealed issues. But this constitutive . 
uncertainty at the center of becoming does not defeat the central 
point.28 It, rather, reminds US how ethical uncertainty haunts 
the politics of being and becoming and how important it is to 
cultivate an ethos of critical responsiveness never entirely 
reducible to a fixed moral code. For often enough, obscure 
pains, objective disorders, low levels of energy, perverse 
sexualities, basic inferiorities, uncivilized habits, hysterical 
symptoms, inherent abnormalities, and unreliable moral 
dispositions become reconfigured through a politics of becoming 
and critical responsiveness that first exceeds the official reach 
of justice and then places new dimensions of life on its 
register. And these effects show justice to be an essentially 
ambiguous practice, insufficient unto itself. No general concept 
of the person can resolve that constitutive ambiguity into a 
sufficient code or set of criteria: it will either (like the 
Rawlsian model) be too formal to reach deeply enough into the 
density of culturally constituted identities or (like the 
communitarian model) too specific to respond to diverse 
possibilities of being that may turn out to be acceptable or 
admirable after the politics of becoming brings them into being. 
It is better to respond to this constitutive ambiguity by 
cultivating critical responsiveness to the politics of becoming, 
acknowledging that the practice of justice depends upon an 
ethical reserve it is incapable of subjecting to definitive 
regulation. 
Rawls is pulled by the demand that things be still at 
bottom. He wants--after the historical becoming of liberalism-- 
persons and the generic facts about them to remain stationary so 
that liberal justice can be (nearly) sufficient onto itself. One 
should offer a moment of tribute to those who cling to such a 
winter doctrine during difficult times... They do honor one 
important dimension of ethical life in the face of forces which 
press relentlessly against it. But it is even more important to 
emphasize how things don't stay still. Any doctrine of liberalism 
that pretends they do poses barriers to modes of becoming to 
which it might otherwise be responsive. This drive to stillness 
is the crucial, secular, Rawlsian sensibility to contest by those 
who think the politics of becoming never ends. Because Rawls 
hides his comprehensive doctrine inside a closet in the private 
realm, the contestation has to proceed through symptomatic 
readings of the effects the underlying doctrine has on publicly 
articulated conceptions. 
Dialectical Prouress and the Politics 9f Becominq 
But isn't it time for a post-secularist, too, to become 
reasonable? Doesn't the trajectory of change in the shape of 
western universals reveal a historical dialectic filling the 
universal out progressively? Doesn't it show, retrospectively, 
how historically tolerable suffering imposed upon slaves, women, 
Indians, atheists and homosexuals was actually unjust, and hence, 
how an enriched cultural universal draws us ever closer to the 
universal? If we can't be Rawlsians, can we not at least become 
neo-Hegelians? 
We can. It is indeed very difficult not to from time to 
time--whenever we honor the politics of becoming retrospectively. 
Rawls, for instance, is a neo-Hegelian with respect to M e  
historical becoming of liberalism. And there & an ethical 
compulsion to treat the latest filling out of persons as the 
highest standard of personhood. It is just that this viable 
ethical compulsion soon bumps into a discordant ethical 
imperative: to pursue practices of genealogy, deconstruction, 
political disturbance and the politics of becoming through which 
contemporary self-satisfied unities are rendered more 
problematical and more responsive to new movements of difference. , 
Attunement to the politics of &coming, then, engenders a bi- 
valent ethical sensibility in which critical tension is 
maintained between these two interdependent and dissonant ethical 
imperatives. 
I resist, then, the winter satisfaction of dialectical 
progress without being able either to forgo its imperatives and 
comforts at some moments or to disprove it definitively.= 
Perhaps every new constellation of cultural identities, even as 
it relieves palpable modes of suffering, introduces new artifacts 
of identity and difference onto the social register. Perhaps 
these historically contingent forms carry a.series of surprises 
with them, including modes of suffering exceeding the capacities 
of this cultural constellation to recognize and respond to it. 
The publication of these obscure injuries will be entangled in a 
new round in the politics of becoming. What if a) the energy and 
suffering of embodied human beings provides a starting point from 
which becoming and critical responsiveness proceed and b) no 
intrinsic pattern of identity\difference. on the other side of 
suffering consolidates being as such? Would it not then be wise 
to maintain ethical tension between being and becoming, even to 
sanctify becoming so as to counter powerful tendencies normally 
in place to tilt moral energies in the other direction? 
When a dialectical rendering of the politics of becoming 
suggests that the most recent identities are the most true: 
natural or advanced, it discourages proponents from cultivating 
now that partial, comparative sense of contingency in their own 
identities out of which responsiveness to new claims of 
difference might proceed. A dialectician must be poised in front 
of a final act always about to commence or a dialectical reading 
pf thinas cannot & vindicated. For how could a dialectical 
reading of things be sustained unless the standard that redeems 
it is now discernible in vague outline just over the horizon? 
Contemporary dialecticians, therefore, always proceed as if they 
were on the cutting edge of the last historical moment. Most have 
learned just enough from the record of Hegel, Marx and Fukuyama 
to refrain from shouting this presumption out, but not enough to 
fight against obscure injuries it legitimizes today. 
If a politician of the dialectic thinks that things have 
been developing up to this penultimate moment on the edge of 
stasis, the politician of becoming thinks it is critical at this 
same moment to initiate the politics of becoming in some domain 
and/or to cultivate critical responsiveness to some forces 
pressing against existing stabilizations. Moreover, the 
politician of becoming thinks a generous ethos emerges when a 
number of constituencies engage actively and comparatively those 
differences in themselves 'and others the regulation of which 
enables them to be what they are.   his end, then, forms a 
regulative ideal for the politician of becoming, a complex, final 
act never entirely susceptible to completion because some of its 
components are never entirely synchronized with the others at any 
particular time. It places two politicians of difference fairly 
close.to one another, along one dimension for a moment. If these 
two types were to converge upon an ambidextrious characterization 
of the regulative ideal, other differences between them would 
fade, though they would still debate which vocabularv best 
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expressed that convergence and what balance between being and 
becoming must be sought at any particular moment. Such debates 
remain crucial to the ethics of engagement, as long as the 
tension between being and becoming persists, enough people care 
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